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The Enforcement Of United States Default
Judgments In Spain
By ORLANDo A. GONZALEZ-ARlAS
B.A., University of Miami, 1977 J.D., Nova University Center for the Study of
Law, 1983; Licenciatura en Derecho (Candidate), Faculty of Law, University
of Alcala-Henares, 1987 Associate, Baker & McKenzie, Madrid, Spain.
In a landmark decision the Constitutional Court of Spain upheld an
appellate court's ruling that granted recognition, or exequatur, to a de-
fault judgment rendered by a United States district court. Issued barely
four months after Spain's January 1, 1986, entry into the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC),1 the Constitutional Court's decision in How-
ard v. Kassnar Imports2 portends a major departure from the prevailing
Spanish judicial doctrine that held foreign civil default judgments gener-
ally unenforceable.'
This Article will describe the law that governs the recognition of
foreign civil judgments in Spain, particularly judgments entered in de-
fault. In addition, it will examine the Spanish Supreme Court's decision
in Howard v. Kassnar Imports,4 which effectively discarded the Spanish
fifty-year-old doctrine that was generally hostile toward the granting of
exequatur to foreign civil default judgments. Finally, the Article will re-
view the Constitutional Court's April 15, 1986, decision which upholds
the Supreme Court's ruling and reinforces the new, positive attitude of
Spain's judiciary toward the issue of exequatur.
I. HISTORY
The case that gave rise to the Constitutional Court's opinion began a
continent away. In 1972 Kassnar Imports Inc., a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion that imports sporting goods, received a shipment of shotguns manu-
1. Accession to European Community, [Doing Business in Europe] Common Market
Rep. (CCH) 28,111 (Aug. 15, 1985).
2. Judgment of Apr. 15, 1986, Tribunal Constitutional, Spain, 1986, Boletin Oficial del
Estado 102.
3. In this Article, the terms "recognize" and "enforce" are synonymous. When the
Supreme Court recognizes a foreign default judgment by granting exequatur, the Court may
then enforce the judgment as if it were issued by a Spanish court.
4. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1985, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1985, Jurisprudencia Civil 577.
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factured by the Spanish company Zabala Hermfnos, S.A. The United
States company sold some of the weapons to a wholesaler in Wisconsin
who, in turn, delivered them to a Michigan retailer. Eventually, Michael
Howard purchased one of the shotguns. During a hunting trip in 1976,
Howard's gun accidentally discharged, even though the gun's safety
mechanism was on. The discharge severely injured Howard's foot. An
expert examined the gun and concluded that it had been manufactured
defectively.
A short time after the accident Howard sued Kassnar in a Michigan
state court, alleging negligence and breach of express and implied war-
ranties. Kassnar removed the case to the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Michigan, Northern Division, and Kassnar joined
the Spanish company as a third-party defendant.
The federal district court served process on Zabala Herminos, S.A.,
by registered mail at its two Spanish addresses, with delivery confirmed
by return receipt. The Spanish company failed to answer the complaint
or to appear in court. Six months later, on May 22, 1981, the Michigan
federal court found Kassnar liable for negligence and breach of warran-
ties. The court awarded the plaintiff $123,665.51 in damages, including
interest and costs.' After Kassnar satisfied the award, the court entered
a default judgment against Zabala Hermdnos, S.A., holding it liable to
Kassnar for $137,537.35 plus interest of twelve percent per year until the
date of payment.'
Because the Spanish company had no assets in the United States
which could be used to satisfy the judgment, Kassnar petitioned the
Supreme Court of Spain on February 15, 1984, seeking recognition of the
default judgment. One year later the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Howard v. Kassnar Imports and ordered enforcement of the United
States default judgment.7 Execution of the judgment, however, was
halted on April 15, 1985, when the Spanish company filed an appeal
(recurso de amparo) with the Constitutional Court.' The Spanish com-
pany alleged, among other things, that the Court's recognition of the for-
eign default judgment violated the Spanish company's constitutionally-
protected right to effective legal representation. On May 29, 1985, the
Constitutional Court agreed to hear the case.9
5. Howard v. Kassnar Imports, No. M79-1OCA (W.D. Mich. May 22, 1981).
6. Howard v. Kassnar Imports, No. M79-10CA.
7. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1985, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1985, Jurisprudencia Civil 577.
8. Recurso de Amparo 325/85 of Apr. 15, 1986.
9. Orden del Tribunal Constitucional nfimero 325/85, May 29, 1985.
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II. ENFORCING A FOREIGN JUDGMENT IN SPAIN
The Supreme Court of Spain (Tribunal Supremo) generally has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to hear cases that concern the recognition of foreign
judgments.1" The only exception to this exclusive jurisdiction occurs
when a foreign jurisdiction has signed a treaty for the enforcement of
foreign judgments with Spain." In such a case the forum indicated in
the treaty will have jurisdiction to hear the request for exequatur.12
As the court of last appeal, the Supreme Court's decisions to grant
or deny recognition are generally final and may not be appealed. When
constitutional issues are involved, however, the Supreme Court's deci-
sions may be appealed to the Constitutional Court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to rule on matters of constitutional law.'"
Spain's Law of Civil Procedure (LEC) establishes a three-tier system
for the recognition of foreign judgments. The first and most direct man-
ner by which Spain gives effect to a foreign judgment is through a treaty.
Thus, article 951 of the LEC states that: "Final judgments rendered in
foreign countries shall have the same effect in Spain as that established in
the respective treaties." Because Spain and the United States have not
signed a treaty on the recognition of foreign judgments this method cann-
not be used.14
10. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL [LEC] art. 955 (Spain). The "Tribunal Supremo" is
the court of last appeal in Spain. It hears civil, criminal, and administrative cases. It does not,




13. LEC, art. 956. An appeal (recurso de amparo), however, may be brought before the
"Tribunal Constitucional" when the defendant in a foreign judgment granted exequatur be-
lieves that the Tribunal Supremo has breached the fundamental right protected under articles
14-29 of the Constitution. In the case of a foreign default judgment granted recognition in
Spain, the defendant may base the appeal on article 24(1) of the Constitution which states that
all persons have the right to judicial protection of their legitimate interests and no one may be
denied the opportunity to present a defense. CONSTITUTI6N ESPANOLA DE 1978 art. 24(2)
(Spain).
14. Spain has signed treaties with the following countries: Peru, Treaty on the Recogni-
tion of Foreign Judgments, Aug. 14, 1879, 250 Gaceta de Madrid (Apr. 12, 1880); Switzer-
land, Nov. 19, 1896, 190 Gaceta de Madrid (July 9, 1898); Colombia, May 30, 1980, 108
Gaceta de Madrid (Apr. 18, 1909); Czechoslovakia, Nov. 29, 1927, and Nov. 26, 1928, 155
Gaceta de Madrid (June 4, 1930); France, May 28, 1969, 63 Boletin in Oficial del Estado
(BOE); and Italy, May 22, 1973, 273 B.O.E. (Nov. 15. 1977). In addition, on April 10, 1930,
Spain ratified a treaty with Great Britain on mutual assistance in civil and commercial proce-
dure. 100 Gaceta de Madrid, Apr. 10, 1930. Spain is also a signatory to the following multilat-
eral treaties: The Hague Convention of Mar. 1, 1954, on Civil Procedure, 286 U.N.T.S. 265;
The Rome Agreement of Oct. 7, 1952, on Damages caused Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties,
310 U.N.T.S. 181; Convention: International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
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A second way in which Spain enforces foreign judgments is through
the principle of reciprocity. The rules that govern this principle appear
in articles 952 and 953 of the LEC, which declare the following:
If there are no special treaties with the country in which the judg-
ment has been pronounced, it shall have the same force [in Spain] as
that given by the foreign country to judgments rendered in Spain .... 15
If the judgment comes from a country where, as a matter of case law,
judgments of Spanish courts are not complied with, [the foreign judg-
ment] shall not be enforceable in Spain. 16
In essence, article 952 establishes the principle of "positive reciproc-
ity," under which Spain will recognize a foreign jurisdiction's judgment if
that jurisdiction would give effect to a comparable Spanish judgment.
On the other hand, article 953 expresses the principle of "negative reci-
procity," under which Spain will not enforce a foreign judgment from a
jurisdiction that, as established by case law, does not recognize Spanish
judgments.
To determine reciprocity, Spain looks to statutes and case law. As
indicated by article 953's expression of negative reciprocity, if there is a
conflict between statutory and case law, the latter will prevail.' 7 In any
case, negative reciprocity under article 953, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, operates to deny recognition only if the foreign jurisdic-
tion does not recognize Spanish judgments of any kind. 8
The Court has established the necessary elements for positive reci-
procity under article 952.'1 The Court ruled that positive reciprocity de-
pends upon a showing by the interested party that positive reciprocity
exists in fact and that it is special, bilateral, and present.20
The Court generally will find that positive reciprocity exists "in
fact" if the foreign jurisdiction that rendered the judgment has specific
Damage, 973 U.N.T.S. 0; Convention: Maintenance Obligations Towards Children, 39
U.N.T.S. 27; The 1958 U.N. Treaty on the Recognition and Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1959, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (U.S. enters as a party for all
territories on Feb. 1, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997); European Convention on Inter-
national Trade Arbitration of 21 April, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349; and the New York Conven-
tion of June 10, 1959, the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Judgments.
15. LEC art. 952.
16. LEC art. 953.
17. Id.
18. A. REMIRO BROTONS, EJECUCI6N DE SENTENCIAS EXTRANJERAS EN ESPAf4A; LA
JURISPRUDENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO 83 (1974).
19. Id. at 87.
20. Judgment of Oct. 18, 1933, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1933, Rollo 520; Judgment of
Nov. 22, 1966, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1966, Rollo 486; Judgment of Apr. 15, 1972, Tribu-
nal Supremo, Spain, 1972, Rollo 1109.
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statutory law on this issue.2' In the case of the United States, it can be
argued that a state's enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment
Recognition Act22 creates a presumption that reciprocity "in fact" exists
in the jurisdiction in question. This presumption, however, may be re-
butted by contrary case law because, as indicated by article 953, case law
takes precedence over statutory law.23
By requiring a showing that the positive reciprocity is "special," the
Supreme Court compels the interested party to prove that the foreign
jurisdiction will recognize a Spanish judgment with the same characteris-
tics as the foreign judgment sought to be enforced in Spain.24 The judg-
ments need not be identical. Thus, for example, enforceability of a
money judgment in Spain would not necessarily be barred if the foreign
court would not recognize a Spanish divorce judgment.
The requirement that reciprocity be "bilateral" denotes the Court's
preference for decisions from the foreign jurisdiction that specifically rec-
ognizes judgments from Spain, as distinct from those decisions that rec-
ognize only judgments from third countries.25 Finally, the Court's
requirement that reciprocity be "present" simply means that reciprocity
with Spain is based on the foreign jurisdiction's current law. Thus, past
reciprocity, or the lack of it, and anticipated future reciprocity are irrele-
vant.26 Recent evidence of reciprocity will therefore carry more weight
with the Court than past showings of reciprocity.
A third way in which Spain recognizes foreign judgments is through
LEC article 954. The article states the following:
If none of the preceding articles apply, [foreign] judgments will be
enforced in Spain if the following conditions are met:
1. The judgment was rendered as a result of an in personam
action.
2. The judgment was not rendered in default.
3. The obligation sought to be enforced in the action is legal in
Spain.
4. The judgment decree contains the elements necessary for it to
be considered authentic in the country of origin, as well as those re-
quired by Spanish law for it to be given effect in Spain.27
21. See A. REMIRO BROToNS, supra note 18, at 126.
22. 13 Uniform Laws Annotated 419 (1980).
23. LEC art. 953.
24. Id. at 87.
25. Id. at 94.
26. Id. at 99.
27. LEC art. 954 [translation by author].
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This "catch-all" provision apparently was written to prevent Spain
from distancing itself from jurisdictions which have neither the laws nor
the jurisprudence to deal specifically with the recognition of Spanish
judgments.2 8
A literal reading of the language of articles 951 through 954 indi-
cates that the three methods of recognizing a foreign judgment should be
applied on a hierarchical basis and independently of each other. There-
fore, if a treaty is involved, article 951 would govern. If there is no rele-
vant treaty, then positive or negative reciprocity under articles 952 and
953 would apply. Finally, article 954, with its nondefault requirement,
controls "if none of the preceding articles apply."
Through the years, however, the Supreme Court has expanded arti-
cle 954's application at the expense of the other provisions. The Court
has maintained that article 954 provides a set of "minimum standards"
which are necessary to recognize foreign judgments, even when the party
shows positive reciprocity under article 952.29 As a result of the
Supreme Court's expansion of article 954, the Court has foundered in
deciding cases that involve default judgments. The Court frequently
grants exequatur on the basis of reciprocity while at other times it denies
recognition based on the nondefault requirement of article 954, even
when positive reciprocity is proven.3"
III. POSITIVE RECIPROCITY AND THE NONDEFAULT
REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE 954
The drafters of article 954 apparently intended the nondefault re-
quirement to protect Spanish nationals from enforcement of judgments
rendered by foreign courts without proper subject matter or personal ju-
risdiction.3" Additionally, some Spanish legal commentators assert that
requiring the foreign judgment not be based on default protects a Spanish
defendant who did not have a sufficient opportunity to present an ade-
quate defense.32 One such commentator, Antonio Remiro Brotons, au-
28. P. GOIEZ DE LA SERNA, MOTIVOS DE LAS VARIACIONES PRINIPALES QUE HA IN-
TRODUCIDO EN LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS LA LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL 169 (1857).
29. See Judgment of June 7, 1932, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1933, Rollo 488; Judgment
of Apr. 11, 1961, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1961, Aranzadi 1211.
30. BROTONS, supra note 18, at 123.
31. Alvarez, El Reconocimiento y la Ejecucidn en Territorio Espaifol, de las Decisiones
Extranjeras en Materias Civiles o Mercantiles, 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL IBER-
OAMERICANA 873 (1973).
32. V. CORTtS, DERECCHO PROCESAL CIVIL INTERNACIONAL 150 (1981).
[Vol. I0
Enforcement of Default Judgments in Spain
thor of a respected treatise on the subject of exequatur, justifies the
nondefault requirement of article 954 by stating that its purpose:
is not to arbitrarily favor the defendant ... but to earnestly pro-
tect [the defendant] from the consequences of an inadequate defense
arising from either having to appear before a foreign court which lacks
a reasonable nexus to the issue being litigated or from not having been
served or, if served, not having been done so with enough time... to
prepare an adequate defense.33
Commentaries such as this suggest that default alone is insufficient
to deny recognition of a foreign civil judgment in Spain. The expressed
motives behind enactment of the nondefault requirement suggest that the
key issue in determining whether to deny exequatur is not the existence
of a default judgment per se, but rather the circumstances that surround
the rendering of the judgment. Therefore, a default judgment will be
denied exequatur only if the judgment was rendered under circumstances
in which the foreign court did not have proper personal or subject matter
jurisdiction or the defendant was not properly served and notified. Any
other interpretation of article 954's nondefault requirement arbitrarily
favors the defendant-usually a Spanish national-contrary to the re-
quirement's purpose.3 4
In the past, however, the Supreme Court easily denied exequatur to
foreign civil default judgments based on article 954's nondefault require-
ment. The Court denied exequatur without even examining the basis of
the foreign court's jurisdiction or the circumstances surrounding service
of process.3 Indeed, the Court ruled in prior decisions that article 954
should be read literally, with a default judgment being an absolute bar to
the granting of recognition in Spain.3"
In the rare cases in which the Court examined the circumstances
surrounding the basis of jurisdiction and service of process in a foreign
lawsuit, it usually did so in a haphazard manner. This suggested that the
Court was more interested in finding an excuse to deny recognition than
genuinely interested in the merits of the claim for exequatur.37 In one
such case, for example, the Court denied exequatur to a Cuban court
33. BROTONS, supra note 18, at 212. See also Judgment of Mar. 14, 1964, Tribunal
Supremo, Spain, 1964, Rollo 585.
34. Brotons, supra note 18, at 124.
35. Id. at 121.
36. See Judgment of Jan. 26, 1932, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1933, Rollo 493; Judgment
of Mar. 22, 1958, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1958, Rollo 777; Judgment of Mar. 23, 1965,
Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1965, Aranzadi, 1485; Judgment of June 25, 1969, Tribunal
Supremo, Spain, 1969, Aranzadi 1663.
37. BROTONS, supra note 18, at 215.
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judgment rendered against a Spanish bank domiciled in Barcelona."8 In
that case, the Cuban plaintiff served the bank's agent, and the agent de-
fended the case. Apparently, however, the agent never notified the prin-
cipal of the suit. The Spanish Supreme Court held that the
circumstances amounted to a de facto default judgment that could not be
recognized due to the nondefault requirement of article 954. In another
case, a German court entered judgment against a Spanish bank domiciled
in the northern Basque region of Guipuzcoa. The Court similarly re-
fused to recognize the judgment due to a defect in the bank's lawyer's
power of attorney in the foreign lawsuit.3 9
To muddle the subject of exequatur even more, the Supreme Court
also intertwined the concept of reciprocity with the "minimum stan-
dards" requirement of article 954. Apparently the Court sought to but-
tress its conclusions regarding positive or negative reciprocity (which,
theoretically, should have been enough to decide the issue) by using arti-
cle 954 to support its decisions to grant or to deny exequatur.4° In the
case in which the Court used article 954 in conjunction with reciprocity,
the Court declared that even if it reached the opposite result on the reci-
procity issue, it would still have to grant or deny exequatur depending on
whether article 954 requirements were met.41 In 1969 the Court con-
firmed this trend of expanding the application of article 954 at the ex-
pense of the other provisions of the LEC. In a decision which denied
recognition of a judgment rendered in Luxembourg, the Court stated:
The moving party has not presented any proof as to the existence
of reciprocity in the enforcement of our judgments in the mentioned
country and consequently the request must be denied; even more so as
it is a default judgment which, in case of doubt (on the issue of reci-
procity), would be barred, according to article 954, paragraph 2, of the
referred procedural law. 42
By disregarding the literal, hierarchical, and independent structure
of the LEC provisions and by coupling the concept of reciprocity and
article 954, the Supreme Court created confusion regarding how it would
rule when reciprocity and article 954 pointed in opposite directions. The
classic "showdown" occurred in cases in which the party proved positive
reciprocity but the foreign judgment was rendered in default. In those
38. Judgment of Oct. 18, 1933, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1933, Rollo 449.
39. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1935, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1935, 218 Jurisprudencia Civil
358 nfim. 69.
40. BROTONS, supra note 18, at 119.
41. Id.
42. Judgment of Nov. 5, 1969, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1969, Rollo 555.
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cases the Court's decisions lacked coherence and often granted or denied
recognition based on the peculiarities of each case.
43
As a result of this confusion, jurists, lawyers, and law professors
jointly called upon the Court to clarify the law on the recognition of
foreign civil judgments, especially as it pertained to cases rendered in
default.' Antonio Remiro Brotons reiterated these demands in his book:
"Obviously the insecurity and uncertainty created by this situation do
not give those individuals seeking to enforce a valid judgment in Spain
reason to be hopeful. A clarification is called for. The best solution,
without a doubt, is to revise the entire system."45 Finally, the Court
solved this problem in Howard v. Kassnar Imports.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN HOWARD V.
KASSNAR IMPORTS
Writing the opinion for the five-member Court, Judge Martin-
Granizo Fernafsdez noted the historical reasons which had influenced the
Court to adopt a strongly critical posture toward the granting of exe-
quatur to foreign default judgments.46 According to Judge Fernafidez,
the historical background included an effort to protect Spanish nationals
from foreign default judgments rendered by foreign courts lacking proper
subject matter or personal jurisdiction. The Court also feared that in
cases involving foreign default judgments the Spanish defendant might
not have been served properly or timely and, therefore, could not have
had an opportunity to present an adequate defense.47
Judge Fernafidez then discussed the more recent history of the
Court's foreign default judgment decisions. He noted that the Court had
begun to carve out exceptions to the rule that generally denied the recog-
nition of foreign civil default judgments based on the nondefault require-
ment of article 954.48 The carved exceptions were necessary, according to
the Judge, because of Spain's expanding commercial links with the rest of
43. BROTONS, supra note 18, at 218. See eg., Judgment of Mar. 20, 1931, Tribunal
Supremo, Spain, 1931; Judgment of Feb. 20, 1962, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1962; Judgment
of Dec. 7, 1977, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1966; Judgment of Nov. 5, 1969, Tribunal
Supremo, Spain, 1969.
44. Prieto-Castro Ferrandiz, Las Sentencias y Laudos Extranjeros como Tftulos Simple-
mente Homologables o Susceptibles de Ejecucidn Mediante Exequatur, 2 DERECHO PROCESAL
CIVIL 268 (1969); See also GOKaEZ DE LA SERNA, supra note 28, at 878.
45. BROTONS, supra note 18, at 123.
46. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1985, Tribunal Supremo, Spain,1985, Jurisprudencia Civil 577,
5277.
47. Id. at 5277.
48. Id.
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the world.49 In particular, the increasing number of Spanish companies
doing business abroad and the concomitant rise in foreign litigation ne-
cessitated a more flexible handling of the issue of exequatur. The Court
also began to suspect that, in some cases, Spanish nationals used the
Court's strong bias against the recognition of foreign default judgments
to elude obligations legitimately entered into in other countries.5
The Court cited two cases as examples of the trend to limit denials
of enforcement. The Judge indicated that in a September 10, 1982, deci-
sion the Court enforced a foreign default judgment based on the fact that
it was the Spanish defendant in the foreign litigation who asked the
Court to grant exequatur.5 ' Shortly thereafter, on June 1, 1983, the
Court again granted exequatur to a foreign default judgment, this time
stating that the interests of the Spanish defendant in the foreign litigation
had been protected by the appointment of a public defender.12
Evident from these decisions, declared Judge Fernafidez, is the
Court's desire to protect the defendant from the consequences of a de-
fault judgment rendered when the party did not have an opportunity to
present an adequate defense. The Judge added, however, that the con-
cern to protect the defendant must be tempered against the long-term
effects that such an unrestrained policy would have on international
commerce. 
53
As a guideline for determining whether the party had an opportu-
nity to mount a sufficient defense, Judge Fernafidez referred to the ex-
isting case law interpreting the 1958 U.N. Treaty on the Recognition and
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 4 In these decisions, the
Supreme Court held that foreign default arbitration judgments are gener-
ally enforceable in Spain. The only exception is for foreign default arbi-
tration judgments rendered under circumstances in which the defaulting
party was not properly notified of the proceeding or, if notified, could not
present an adequate defense.56
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Judgment of Sept. 10, 1982, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1982, Rollo 462.
52. Judgment of June 17, 1983, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1983, Jurisprudencia 6736.
53. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1985, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1985, Jurisprudencia Civil 577,
5277.
54. Boletin Oficial del Estado, number 164, July 11, 1977. Spain ratified the treaty on
April 29, 1977.
55. See Judgment of Feb. 10, 1984, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1984, Jurisprudencia 649;
Judgment of Oct. 8, 1981, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1981, Jurisprudencia 3588.
56. Ramos M6ndez, Primeras Aplicaciones del Convenio de Nueva York de 10 de Junio de
1958 al Exequatur de Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras por el Tribunal Supremo, 3 JUSTICIA
107 (1982).
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On this basis, Judge Fernaidez pointed out that in a February 11,
1981, opinion," the Court enforced a British arbitral award for $120,000
issued in default against a Spanish company. Judge Beltr6n de Heredia,
writing the opinion for the Court, held that, although the lack of oppor-
tunity to defend could be the basis to deny exequatur, default per se was
no obstacle. The Judge stated that: "The failure to appear can have no
other basis than the unilateral and anti-juridical will to refuse to fulfill
contractual agreements and to recognize the jurisdiction freely and vol-
untarily accepted, with an unacceptable disregard for the most funda-
mental principles of international juridical intercourse."58 Although
Judge BeltrAn de Heredia did not discuss what constitutes a "lack of
opportunity to defend" as grounds to deny exequatur, past decisions have
established that it amounts to a failure to serve properly the defendant. 9
According to Spanish law, for purposes of foreign enforcement, "proper
service" is defined under the laws of the jurisdiction that handed down
the judgment.60
In view of these decisions, Judge Fernmdez indicated that the Court
could not find sufficient justification for generally treating the enforce-
ment of foreign default arbitration awards favorably, while at the same
time being highly critical of the recognition of its equivalent, the foreign
civil default judgment.61 To do so, declared the Judge, would result in
the sanctioning of an "authentic fraudem legis."62
To avoid this result, the Court would decide whether the nondefault
requirement of article 954 would act to bar the recognition of foreign
civil default judgments by analogizing to the Court's interpretation of
the 1958 U.N. Treaty on the Recognition and Execution of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards.63 Furthermore, as it has construed the Convention, the
Court held that there are three types of default judgments: (1) those
termed "default by conviction" (rebeldla por convicidn), in which the de-
fendant fails to appear because of a genuine and reasonable belief that the
foreign court lacks proper jurisdiction over the matter; (2) "default by
57. Judgment of Nov. 5, 1969, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1969, Rollo 555; Judgment of
Feb. 11, 1981, 670.
58. Id. at 671.
59. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1935, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1935, Jurisprudencia Civil 358;
Judgment of Mar. 23, 1965, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1965, Rollo 968. See also supra note 12,
at 219-223.
60. LEC art. 525. See also BROTONS, supra note 18, at 220.
61. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1985, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1985, Jurisprudencia Civil 577,
5277(2).
62. Id. at 5277(1).
63. Id. at 5277(2).
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choice" (rebeldla por conveniencia), in which a defendant who has been
properly served and notified of the proceeding and does not question the
jurisdiction of the foreign court, nevertheless chooses not to appear; and
(3) those defined as "default by force" (rebeldfa a la fuerza), which oc-
curs when a defendant is not properly served or notified of the action or
otherwise does not have enough time to prepare an adequate defense.".
The Supreme Court held that only circumstances involving "default by
force" would justify a denial of exequatur based on article 954's
nondefault requirement.65 In the instant case, the Court pointed out that
Zabala Hermdnos, S.A. had been properly served and notified of the
American action. In addition, the Spanish company had never ques-
tioned the personal or subject matter jurisdiction of the Michigan
court.66 The Court thus stated that the default judgment "was know-
ingly provoked by the defendant," who is now estopped from using it as a
defense in the present action.67
The Court, however, left unresolved the issue of reciprocity versus
the "minimum standards" requirement of article 954. The Court ap-
peared to lean toward endorsing the literal, hierarchical, and indepen-
dent nature of the LEC provisions on exequatur at the beginning of its
opinion. Thus, it declared that article 954 governs "when none of the
other provisions [of the LEC] apply."' 68 Yet, after discussing the ques-
tion of why default alone will no longer be a bar to the enforcement of
foreign civil default judgments, the Court stated that "even if the above
were not sufficient reason for granting exequatur in the instant case," it
would still have to do so based on the existence of reciprocity. 69 The
Court noted that Michigan has adopted the Uniform Foreign Money
Judgment Recognition Act,7 ° which provides that default will be a basis
to deny enforcement of a foreign judgment only when the defendant is
not properly served or notified of the foreign action.7'
It is therefore unclear whether the Court rested its opinion on reci-
procity, the "minimum standards" requirement of article 954, or both
provisions. In any case, the issue of reciprocity versus article 954 be-
comes less important in this context because the distinguishing feature
64. B. Cremades, 2 Revista Juridica Espanola La Ley 648 (1984).
65. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1985, Tribunal Supremo, Spain, 1985, Jurisprudencia Civil 577,
5277(3).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5277(2).
68. Id. at 5277(1).
69. Id.
70. See supra note 22.
71. Id.
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between these two provisions historically has been the nondefault re-
quirement of article 954.72 With the Court's decision in Howard v. Kass-
nar Imports refining the concept of default, the schism between these two
provisions has narrowed significantly. The decision in Howard v. Kass-
nar Imports thus portends a major departure from the Court's previous
view which holds foreign civil default judgments generally unenforceable
in Spain.73
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION
On May 29, 1985, the Constitutional Court temporarily stayed the
execution of the judgment when it agreed to hear the case on appeal.
With Spain's entry into the EEC looming overhead, the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the respondent,
which urged the Court to let the Supreme Court's ruling stand.74
In its argument before the Constitutional Court, the Spanish com-
pany alleged that the Supreme Court's decision violated article 24 of the
1978 Constitution. 75 Article 24 declares that all persons have the right to
effective legal representation. Moreover, it provides that a person may be
tried only by a judge who has jurisdiction over the matter and chosen in
accordance with the dictates of the law.7 6
The Spanish company further contended that the District Court of
Michigan had tried the company in absentia and found it liable for dam-
ages.77 Because the exequatur procedure in Spain does not include an
examination of the merits of the foreign action, the company argued that
it effectively had been deprived of its fundamental right to defend itself,
as guaranteed by the Constitution.78 In addition, the company believed
that the United States Court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion. In essence, it argued that its default had been based on "convic-
tion" rather than by choice, and therefore, the Supreme Court had erred
72. BROTONS, supra note 18, at 123. See also Calvo Caravaca, Exequatur de Divorcio Ex-
tranjero en Espana: Nuevas Directrices del Tribunal Supremo, 2 REVISTA JURIDICA ESPANOLA
LA LEY 249 (1983). See also supra note 9.
73. The Attorney General's Office (Ministeria Fiscal), however, supported the past doc-
trine. In a legal brief, the Attorney General relied on the nondefault requirement of article 954
and urged the Court not to grant exequatur in the Michigan District Court's judgment.
74. See Judgment of Apr. 21, 1986, Tribunal Constitutional, Spain, 1986, Boletin Oficial
del Estado at 102(1).
75. CONST1TUCI6N ESPANOLA DE 1978 art. 24 (Spain).
76. Id.
77. Id. Recurso de Amparo 325/85 of April 15, 1986.
78. The Spanish company defended its failure to appear before the Michigan District
Court by stating that the costs involved were too high to be borne by a small, family-run
business. Recurso de Amparo 325/85 of April 15, 1986, at 6.
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in granting the exequatur.79
The Spanish company also contended that the Supreme Court's de-
cision represented a significant modification of the laws that govern the
recognition of foreign civil default judgments.8" The company therefore
claimed that the decision infringed upon its constitutionally-protected
right to "judicial security"81 and violated the proscription against the
arbitrary exercise of "public powers" contained in the Constitution.82
In an opinion written by Justice Antonio Truyol Serra, the Constitu-
tional Court quickly dismissed the claim that the Supreme Court had
acted arbitrarily in its grant of exequatur. On the contrary, the Court
noted that the Supreme Court had engaged in a careful and detailed anal-
ysis of the evolving law on exequatur. The analysis revealed that succes-
sive court interpretations had chipped away at the doctrine generally
opposed to the recognition of foreign civil default judgments. The Con-
stitutional Court viewed the Supreme Court's decision as the culmination
of this reform movement and thus was far from arbitrary.83 "The deci-
sion adopted by the first chamber of the Supreme Court," added the
Constitutional Court, "is therefore conscious of its jurisprudential evolu-
tion, reasonably arrived at and constitutionally legitimate."84
The Constitutional Court also rejected the Spanish company's claim
that the recognition of the foreign default judgment violated its constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to effective legal representation. The Court
pointed out that the fundamental rights and liberties safeguarded by the
Constitution extend only to areas in which the Spanish state exercises its
sovereignty.86 The Court recognized that the Supreme Court may not
grant exequatur to a foreign judgment which infringes upon the rights of
individuals protected by the Spanish Constitution.87 To determine
whether a foreign judgment encroaches upon constitutionally protected
rights, however, the Court declared that it would look at the due process
79. See Judgment of Apr. 21, 1986, Tribunal Constitutional, Spain, 1986, Boletin Oficial
del Estado at 102(2).
80. Id.
81. The Constitutional Court has interpreted "judicial security" to mean compliance with
the rule of law. Judgment of Dec. 23, 1982, Tribunal Constitucional, Spain, 1982, Boletin
Oficial del Estado 15. See also M. FRAILE CLIVILLf-S, CODIGO CONSTITUCIONAL 32 (1983).
82. See CONSTITuci6N ESPAE4OLA DE 1978 art. 9.
83. See Judgment of Apr. 21, 1986, Tribunal Constitutional, Spain, 1986, Boletin Oficial
del Estado at 102(1).
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guarantees provided by the foreign jurisdiction.88 Moreover, the Court
held that the Supreme Court's findings on this issue would be critical.89
Thus, if the Supreme Court finds that the defendant had been prop-
erly notified and served of the foreign action and grants exequatur on the
basis of "default by choice," the Constitutional Court declared that it
would most likely find no encroachment on respondent's right to effec-
tive legal representation.90 In the instant case, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Federal District Court had properly served and notified
the Spanish company of the lawsuit.9 "The respondent had therefore
been given an opportunity to defend itself," declared the Constitutional
Court. "The lack of an effective representation which it now claims was
therefore caused solely and exclusively by its own action." 92
More importantly, the Court held that a foreign court's failure to
comply strictly with all of the due process requirements of Spanish law
does not necessarily imply a violation of a person's constitutional
rights.93 The critical factor is, instead, whether the foreign court has
respected "essential" due process rights. The Constitutional Court indi-
cated that the essential due process requirement is the right to a proper
and timely service of process in an action in which the foreign court has
personal and subject matter jurisdiction.94
Finally, on the issue of the foreign court's jurisdiction over the Span-
ish company, the Constitutional Court held that this was a question of
fact to be determined by the Supreme Court.95 Nevertheless, the Court
recognized that by selling its products abroad the Spanish company may
be held to have established sufficient contacts with a foreign country for
that nation's courts to acquire jurisdiction over the company. 96 Alluding
to the country's recent incorporation into the EEC, the Court declared
that Spain could not continue to engage in trade and commerce in world
markets based on the terms of Spanish Law. "By exporting its products
abroad," concluded the Court, "respondent has established a connection






92. Id. at 102(2).
93. Id. at 102(3).
94. Id. at 102(3).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 102(4).
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